The "_laws_," here mentioned, and impliedly sanctioned, are, of course, only _constitutional_ laws--laws, that are consistent, both with the constitution of the state, and the constitution of the United States. None others are "_laws_," correctly speaking, however they may attempt to "hold persons to service or labor," or however they may have the forms of laws on the statute books. This word "laws," therefore, being a material word, leaves the whole question just where it found it--for it certainly does not, _of itself_--nor indeed does any other part of the clause--say that acts of a legislature, declaring one man to be the property of another, is a "_law_" within the meaning of the constitution. As far as the word "_laws_" says any thing on the subject, it says that such acts are _not_ laws--for such acts are clearly inconsistent with natural law--and it yet remains to be shown that they are consistent with any constitution whatever, state or national. The burden of proof, then, still rests upon the advocates of slavery, to show that an act of a state legislature, declaring one man to be the property of another, is a "law," within the meaning of this clause. To assert simply that it is, without proving it to be so, is a mere begging of the question--for that is the very point in dispute. The question, therefore, of the _constitutionality_ of the slave acts must first be determined, before it can be decided that they are "laws" within the meaning of the constitution. That is, they must be shown to be consistent with the constitution, before they can be said to be sanctioned as "laws" by the constitution. Can any proposition be plainer than this? And yet the reverse must be assumed, in this case, by the advocates of slavery. The simple fact, that an act purports to "hold persons to service or labor," clearly cannot, _of itself_, make the act constitutional. If it could, any act, purporting to hold "persons to service or labor," would necessarily be constitutional, without any regard to the "persons" so held, or the conditions on which they were held. It would be constitutional, _solely because it purported to hold persons to service or labor_. If this were the true doctrine, any of us, without respect of persons, might be held to service or labor, at the pleasure of the legislature. And then, if "service or labor" mean slavery, it would follow that any of us, without discrimination, might be made slaves. And thus the result would be, that the acts of a legislature would be constitutional, _solely because they made slaves of the people_. Certainly this would be a new test of the constitutionality of laws.