The United States and Latin AmericaLatané, John Holladay
History
The United States and Latin America
Latané, John Holladay
Latin America -- Foreign relations -- United States; United States -- Foreign relations -- Latin America
begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless
Alliance, calling itself Holy.[58]
Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the
British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further
and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American
republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion
of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks, who were then
struggling for independence from Turkey.[59] Monroe, it appears, was
strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a
different view of the situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams,
Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of
November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and
on Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of the
President's message remained in doubt until the 21st, when the more
conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the
case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the part
of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's proposals,
though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his position as
follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance
against the interference of the European powers by force with South
America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to
make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."[60] Adams's
dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the
influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American system, partly to the
fact that the proposed cooperation with Great Britain would bind the
United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Spanish
possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as the ally
of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He
probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that
the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest
of South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from
the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was
supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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