The Victories of Wellington and the British ArmiesMaxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
History
The Victories of Wellington and the British Armies
Maxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
Great Britain -- History, Military -- 19th century; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
The British corps, amounting to eight thousand men, was concentrated
at Messina. In Calabria the French were considerably detached; and
though numerically stronger, with three thousand in the South, four
thousand in Upper Calabria, and the remainder occupying numerous posts,
it was quite practicable to take them in detail, effect a landing
between the two corps, engage them separately, and clear the country
from St. Euphemia to the Castle of Scylla. To insure success, despatch
and secrecy were required. The first rested with Stuart, and every
arrangement necessary on his part was effected; the latter depended on
the Sicilian court, and by it the secrecy of the intended expedition
was undoubtedly betrayed.
On the 28th of June, at Melazzo, the embarkation of five thousand men
was quietly accomplished--and on the third morning they landed on
the beach of St. Euphemia. During the 2nd and 3rd stores and supplies
were disembarked; and moving forward, on that evening the pickets of
the rival armies confronted each other. The enemy’s force was at first
supposed to be merely the division of Upper Calabria; but that of
the South had formed a junction; and Reynier had now seven thousand
infantry, and a few troops of cavalry amounting to three hundred and
fifty sabres.
The British in numbers were greatly inferior. Five thousand infantry,
six six-pounders and eight mountain guns, formed their whole strength.
Reynier was also in position--his army being posted on some heights
which overlooked the march of the British as they moved through a low
country, at first partially wooded, but opening into a spacious plain,
and of course permitting their numbers and dispositions to be correctly
ascertained by their enemy during the advance.
This, as the result proved, was an unfortunate advantage for the French
General. Whether reckoning too much on his opponent’s inferiority
of force, or undervaluing the character of his soldiers, Reynier,
supposing that Stuart, having advanced in error, would retire on
discovering his mistake, abandoned the heights, passed a river in his
front, and offered battle on the plain. As his columns approached,
General Stuart at once perceived, from the ground they covered, that
Reynier’s force was much larger than he had expected, and that he
had united his detached brigades; but, with the just confidence of a
British leader he trusted to the bravery of his troops; and in that
safe reliance boldly stood “the hazard of the die.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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