“The cant of mediocrity, depend on it, Ned. In the first place, there is no compromise about it; one side or the other gains the victory; and as success is sustained by numbers, the conquerors push their advantages to the utmost. They think of their own grosser interests, their passions and prejudices, rather than of any ‘healthful compromise,’ as you term it. What compromise is there in this infernal code?”—Dunscomb was an ultra himself, in opposition to a system that has a good deal of that which is useful, diluted by more that is not quite so good—“or what in this matter of the election of judges by the people? As respects the last, for instance, had the tenure of office been made ‘good behaviour,’ there would have been something like a compromise; but, no—the conquerors took all; and what is worse, the conquerors were actually a minority of the voters, so easy is it to cow even numbers by political chicanery. In this respect, democracy is no more infallible, than any other form of government.” “I confess, I do not see how this is shown, since the polls were free to every citizen.” “The result fairly proves it. Less than half of the known number of the electors voted for the change. Now, it is absurd to suppose that men who really and affirmatively wished a new constitution would stay away from the polls.” “More so, than to suppose that they who did not wish it, would stay away, too?” “More so; and for this reason. Thousands fancied it useless to stem the current of what they fancied a popular movement, and were passive in the matter. Any man, of an extensive acquaintance, may easily count a hundred such idlers. Then a good many stood on their legal rights, and refused to vote, because the manner of producing the change was a palpable violation of a previous contract; the old constitution pointing out the manner in which the instrument could be altered, which was not the mode adopted. Then tens of thousands voted for the new constitution, who did not know anything about it. They loved change, and voted for change’s sake; and, possibly, with some vague notion that they were to be benefited by making the institutions as popular as possible.” “And is not this the truth? Will not the mass be all the better off, by exercising as much power as they can?” “No; and for the simple reason that masses cannot, in the nature of things, exercise more than a very limited power. You, yourself, for instance, one of the mass, cannot exercise this very power of choosing a judge, as it ought to be exercised, and of course are liable to do more harm than good.” “The deuce I cannot! Why is not my vote as good as your own? or that of any other man?” “For the simple reason, that you are ignorant of the whole matter. Ask yourself the question, and answer it like an honest man: would you—_could_ you, with the knowledge you possess, lay your finger on any man in this community, and say, ‘I make you a judge?’”