The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and IINietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and II
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Nihilism (Philosophy); Power (Philosophy); Values
We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony towards generous feelings,
even when we are beneath them.
Our _haute volée,_ the society consisting of our rich and leisured
men, is more natural: people hunt each other, the love of the sexes
is a kind of sport in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle;
people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily
advantages stand in the first rank, and curiosity and daring are the
rule.
Our attitude towards _knowledge_ is more natural; we are innocent
in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic
manners, we delight in that which is most strictly prohibited, we
should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we were bored in
acquiring it.
Our attitude to _morality_ is also more natural. Principles have become
a laughing-stock; no one dares to speak of his "duty," unless in irony.
But a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued. (Morality is
located in _instinct_ and the rest is despised. Besides this there are
few points of honour.)
Our attitude to _politics_ is more natural: we see problems of power,
of the quantum of power, against another quantum. We do not believe in
a right that does not proceed from a power which is able to uphold it.
We regard all rights as conquests.
Our valuation of _great men and things_ is more natural: we regard
passion as a privilege; we can conceive of nothing great which does not
involve a great crime; all greatness is associated in our minds with a
certain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality.
Our attitude to _Nature_ is more natural: we no longer love her for her
"innocence," her "reason," her "beauty," we have made her beautifully
devilish and "foolish." But instead of despising her on that account,
since then we have felt more closely related to her and more familiar
in her presence. She does _not_ aspire to virtue: we therefore respect
her.
Our attitude towards _Art_ is more natural: we do not exact beautiful,
empty lies, etc., from her; brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it
ascertains things with perfect calm.
In short: there are signs showing that the European of the nineteenth
century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way
towards acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and immorality,
_without bitterness_: on the contrary, he is strong enough to endure
this point of view alone.
To some ears this will sound as though _corruption_ had made strides:
and certain it is that man has not drawn nearer to the "Nature"
which Rousseau speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the
civilisation before which Rousseau _stood in horror._ We have grown
_stronger,_ we have drawn nearer to the seventeenth century, more
particularly to the taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt, Le
Sage, Renard).
121.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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