For if the _relations_ of _things_, and _persons_, and the fitness resulting from thence, be the _rule_ of God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to the _various states_, _conditions_, _tempers_, and _actions_ of free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation. But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by a _rule_ that lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have. CHAPTER III. _Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation._ THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to its _time_, _matter_, and _manner_. But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?” If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to its _matter_ or _manner_, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believing _false revelations_, as for _idolatry_; and as full of guilt for rejecting a _true revelation_, as for denying the only _true God_. _Secondly_, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending the _reasons_, on which the particular _matter_ or _manner_ of any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons for _receiving_ or not _receiving_ a revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God. For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by the _same undeniable_ evidence, as he shews the _creation_ to be his work; if he can make himself as visible in a _particular extraordinary_ manner, as he is by his _general_ and _ordinary_ providence; then, tho’ we are as unqualified to judge of the mysteries of a _revelation_, as we are to judge of the mysteries in _creation_ and _providence_; yet we may be as fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as for denying a general providence.