This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we know _enough_ of it to affirm, that the _creation_ is not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, as _a sufficient proof_ of God’s action and ♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation. ♦ “opperation” replaced with “operation” For, if the creation must be allowed to be the work of God, notwithstanding any _unknown degree_ of power in evil spirits; if we can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were no _such_ spirits; then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if there were no such spirits in being. I do not ask, Whether the _same divine_ perfection is necessary to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such miracles as are there related, as is necessary to _create_? I do not ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask, Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God? Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of that creation? Or, Whether we are in _doubt_ or _uncertainty_ about it, because we do not know the _degree_ of power, that may belong to evil spirits. For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that the _prophecies_ and _miracles_ recorded in scripture, are to be ascribed to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits. For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being the work of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other. For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by reason of their power over it, no _miracles_ can prove the operation of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation itself. For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it can be proved that God _still presides_ over it. And if _all that_ which is extraordinary and miraculous may be accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that which is _ordinary_ shall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.