The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Idea (Philosophy); Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy; Will
(_b._) The form of the _categorical judgment_ is nothing but the form of
judgment in general, in its strictest sense. For, strictly speaking,
judging merely means thinking, the combination of, or the impossibility of
combining, the spheres of the concepts. Therefore the hypothetical and the
disjunctive combination are properly no special forms of the judgment; for
they are only applied to already completed judgments, in which the
combination of the concepts remains unchanged the categorical. But they
again connect these judgments, for the hypothetical form expresses their
dependence upon each other, and the disjunctive their incompatibility.
Mere concepts, however, have only _one_ class of relations to each other,
those which are expressed in the categorical judgment. The fuller
determination, or the sub-species of this relation, are the intersection
and the complete separateness of the concept-spheres, _i.e._, thus
affirmation and negation; out of which Kant has made special categories,
under quite a different title, that of _quality_. Intersection and
separateness have again sub-species, according as the spheres lie within
each other entirely, or only in part, a determination which constitutes
the _quantity_ of the judgments; out of which Kant has again made a quite
special class of categories. Thus he separates what is very closely
related, and even identical, the easily surveyed modifications of the one
possible relation of mere concepts to each other, and, on the other hand,
unites what is very different under this title of relation.
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