Meanwhile German preparations for war went on apace in every direction. Following up the war teachings of Nietzsche and Treitschke and others, General Von Bernhardi issued book after book defining in clear language the alleged national beneficence, biological desirability and inevitability of war, which, when it came, would be “fought to conquer for Germany the rank of a world-power;” the universities and schools and press teemed with militarist ideals and practices; the army charges rose to $250,000,000 and the trained soldiers available at the beginning of 1910 were alleged to have 6,000 field-guns; Colonel Gaedke, the German naval expert, stated on February 24th of that year that the German government was building a fleet of 58 battleships and that “the time is gradually approaching when the German fleet will be superior to all the fleets of the world, with the single exception of the English fleet,” and that in the past twelve years Germany had spent on new ships alone 63,200,000 pounds, or $316,000,000, while between then and 1914 she would spend 57,500,000 pounds more, or $287,500,000. The annual report of the German Navy League in 1910 showed a total of 1,031,339 members as against an estimated membership in Britain’s League of 20,000. Professor T. Schieman of the University of Berlin, in the New York MCCLURE’S MAGAZINE for May of that year, clearly stated that Germany would not submit in future to British naval supremacy or to any limitation of armaments. During this period, also, Heligoland, the island handed over by Britain in 1890 in exchange for certain East African rights, became the key and center of the whole German coast defense system against England. Cuxhaven, Borkum, Emden, Wilhelmshaven—with twice as many Dreadnought docks as Portsmouth—Wangeroog, Bremerhaven, Geestemunde, etc., were magnificently fortified and guarded. Whether dictated by diplomatic considerations and affected latterly by the British-French alliance or influenced by Colonial and naval and commercial ambitions, there could be no doubt as to the danger of the situation at the beginning of 1914. In a book entitled “England and Germany,” published during 1912, Mr. A. J. Balfour, the British conservative leader, replied to various German contributors and gave the British view of the situation: