Reasoning upon these principles, we shall find, that the general tendency of the operations of water upon the surface of this earth is to form plains of lakes, and not, contrarily, lakes of plains. For example, it was not the Rhône that formed the lake of Geneva; for, had the lake subsisted in its present state, while the Rhône had transported all the matter which it is demonstrable had passed through that channel from the Alps, the bed of the lake must have been made a plain through, which the river would continue to pass, but in a changing channel, as it does in any other plain. We are therefore led to believe, that the passage of the Rhône through the lake, in its present state, is not a thing of long existence, compared with the depredations which time had made by that river upon the earth above the lake. But how far there are any means for judging, with regard to the causes of that change which must have taken place, and produced the present state of things about this lake, can only be determined by those who have the proper opportunity of examining that country. If lakes are not in the natural constitution of the earth, when this is elevated from the sea into the place of land, they must be formed by some posterior operation, which may be now considered. There are in nature, that is, in the natural operations of the globe, two ways by which a lake may properly be formed in a place where it had not before existed. One of these is the sliding or overshooting of a mountain or a rock, which, being undermined by the river, and pressed by its weight, may give way, and thus close up the defile through which the river had worn for itself a passage. The other is the operation of an earthquake, which may either sink a higher ground, or raise a lower, and thus produce a lake where none had been before. To which, indeed, may be added a third, the dissolution of saline or soluble earthy substances which had filled the place. So many must have been those alterations upon the surface of the earth which we inhabit, and so short the period of history by which, from the experience of man, we have to judge, that we must be persuaded we see but little of those operations which make any sensible change upon the earth; and we should be cautious not to form a history of nature from our narrow views of things; views which comprehend so little of the effects of time, that they may be considered as nothing in the scale by which we are to calculate what has passed in the works of nature.