Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of ConsciousnessBergson, Henri
Philosophy
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Bergson, Henri
Consciousness; Free will and determinism; Space and time
We do not believe, in spite of all that has been said, that the method
of mean gradations has set psychophysics on a new path. The novel
feature in Delbœuf's investigation was that he chose a particular case,
in which consciousness seemed to decide in Fechner's favour, and in
which common sense itself played the part of the psychophysicist. He
inquired whether certain sensations did not appear to us immediately as
equal although different, and whether it would not be possible to draw
up, by their help, a table of sensations which were double, triple or
quadruple those which preceded them. The mistake which Fechner made,
as we have just seen, was that he believed in an interval between two
successive sensations S and S', when there is simply a _passing_ from
one to the other and not a _difference_ in the arithmetical sense of
the word. But if the two terms between which the passing takes place
could be given simultaneously, there would then be a contrast besides
the transition; and although the contrast is not yet an arithmetical
difference, it resembles it in a certain respect; for the two terms
which are compared stand here side by side as in a case of subtraction
of two numbers. Suppose now that these sensations belong to the same
_genus_ and that in our past experience we have constantly been present
at their march past, so to speak, while the physical stimulus increased
continuously: it is extremely probable that we shall thrust the cause
into the effect, and that the idea of contrast will thus melt into that
of arithmetical difference. As we shall have noticed, moreover, that
the sensation changed abruptly while the stimulus rose continuously,
we shall no doubt estimate the distance between two given sensations
by a rough guess at the number of these sudden jumps, or at least of
the intermediate sensations which usually serve us as landmarks. To
sum up, the contrast will appear to us as a difference, the stimulus
as a quantity, the sudden jump as an element of equality: combining
these three factors, we shall reach the idea of equal quantitative
differences. Now, these conditions are nowhere so well realized as
when surfaces of the same colour, more or less illuminated, are
simultaneously presented to us. Not only is there here a contrast
between similar sensations, but these sensations correspond to a cause
whose influence has always been felt by us to be closely connected with
its distance; and, as this distance can vary continuously, we cannot
have escaped noticing in our past experience a vast number of shades
of sensation which succeeded one another along with the continuous
increase in the cause. We are therefore able to say that the contrast
between one shade of grey and another, for example, seems to us almost
equal to the contrast between the latter and a third one; and if we
define two equal sensations by saying that they are sensations which
a more or less confused process of reasoning interprets as such, we
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