U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 1 (of 5): The Pusan PerimeterMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 1 (of 5): The Pusan Perimeter
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[77] _Ibid._; and Col K. H. Weir ltr to CMC, 16 Apr 54 (Weir,
16 Apr 54).
_Conference With CINCFE_
The commander in chief greeted his visitors cordially and expressed
his pleasure at having Marines in his command again. He commented
briefly on the excellence of the 1st Marine Division and certain
Marine air units which had served under him during World War II. The
general smiled as he mentioned a rumor to the effect that he had been
prejudiced against Marines during the Pacific War. Sweeping aside this
tale as being unfounded, he said that he had always held the greatest
admiration for the Corps and would welcome its units to his command any
time.[78]
[78] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Following this reception, MacArthur meticulously briefed Craig
and Cushman on the critical situation in Korea, where the war was
already entering its fourth week. The commander in chief disclosed
his tentative plans for commitment of the Marines: he would hold
the Brigade in Japan as a force in readiness until an entire Marine
division could be assembled. If he could have this division by
September, he intended to launch an amphibious assault against the port
of Inchon on the west coast. Striking deep in the Communist rear, he
would sever the long lines of communications linking North Korean bases
to the Communist invaders at the front. Thus isolated, the latter would
quickly wither, and Walker’s Eighth Army could smash out of the Pusan
Perimeter.[79]
[79] _Ibid._; and Brig SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, basic rpt.
When MacArthur concluded, he and Craig discussed the organization of
the Brigade. The Marine general emphasized that his command was an
air-ground team; and though few in numbers, the Brigade had a powerful
potential if its air arm remained integral. MacArthur assured him that
the Marine combination would remain intact, unless some emergency
dictated otherwise.
Craig next mentioned that the infantry and artillery units of the
Brigade were at peace strength. MacArthur was surprised to learn that
each battalion had just 2 rifle companies, and each battery only 4 guns
instead of 6. He was even more surprised to find that each of the 6
infantry companies had 50 men less than the number called for in Marine
war tables. The Army leader had been aware of certain shortages when he
sent a message to the Pentagon on 10 July, requesting the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to authorize expansion of the Brigade to a full war-strength
division.[80] He believed at the time, however, that the Brigade itself
would be formed on a wartime basis. Now, confronted with reality, he
ordered his chief of staff to prepare another dispatch to the Joint
Chiefs, asking that the Brigade be expanded to full war strength and
reiterating his request for an entire division.[81]
[80] CINCFE disp to JCS, 10 Jul 50.
[81] CINCFE disp to JCS, 19 Jul 50.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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