U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Training exercises were held every year, usually at Culebra or Vieques
in the Caribbean and San Clemente Island off San Diego. At the
suggestion of the Fleet Marine Force, the Navy purchased Bloodsworth
Island in Chesapeake Bay as the first amphibious gunfire range used for
that purpose alone.
Schools were set up to train Army and Navy as well as Marine officers
as specialists in fire control parties. Air support was closely
integrated with naval gunfire, shore artillery, and troop movements.
Technology came to the aid of tactics when the Fleet Marine Force
encouraged and supervised the designing of strange new amphibious craft
and vehicles. Concepts were actually based in several instances on
landing craft not yet developed and the confidence of the Marine Corps
in American inventiveness proved to be justified.
Thus the Nation entered World War II with a system of offensive tactics
which opened Europe, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific to American
invasion without incurring a single major defeat. Not only was the
United States ahead of the enemy in the development of amphibious
operations but the Axis Powers never found the key to an adequate
defense. In an often quoted summary, the British military critic and
historian, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, has asserted that these
techniques were “in all probability ... the most far-reaching tactical
innovation of the war.”[78]
[78] MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, _The Second World War_ (London,
1948), 207.
During the next few years the Marine Corps was twice officially given
the major responsibility for American amphibious tactics. The National
Security Act of 1947 made it the function of the Corps “to provide
fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air
components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of
advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”[79]
[79] 61 _U. S. Stat. at L._ (1947), 495.
At the so-called Key West Conference the following spring (March 11–14,
1948), the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff restated the
Marine Corps’ mission to include that of developing “in coordination
with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The
Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those
landing force tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common
interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.”[80]
[80] OAFIE, OSD, _The United States Marine Corps_
(Washington, 1950). (Armed Forces Talk No. 317.)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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