The first full day’s operations, on 29 October, resulted in 24 prisoners being taken. But this was a trickle as compared to the torrent which would follow until an average daily rate of 82 was maintained during the 17 days of the operations. _Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies_ Each of the rifle companies was given the mission of sending out daily motorized or foot patrols while manning, as required, company OPs. The three roads were assigned as follows: George Company (Captain Carl L. Sitter), the road to Wonsan; How Company (Captain Clarence E. Corley, Jr.) the road to Seoul; Item Company (First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher), the road to Pyongyang.[166] [166] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 4. All patrols reported negative results throughout the first four days. Nevertheless, a system of artillery and 81mm mortar harassing and interdiction fires on suspected Red Korean assembly areas was put into effect. Major Simmons was designated the Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC), and OYs were used for artillery spotting and to call air strikes when planes were on station.[167] [167] _Ibid._, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56. The battalion commander emphasized to his officers the necessity for maintaining as good relations with the inhabitants as security would permit. Strict troop discipline was to be maintained at all times, and the villagers were allowed their own mayor and council along with such laws or customs as did not conflict with the Marine mission.[168] A policy of justice and fairness had its reward when the inhabitants warned the CIC team of an impending attack by organized NKPA troops. [168] LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51. POW interrogations and reports by civilians identified the enemy unit as the 15th NKPA Division, including the 45th, 48th, and 50th regiments, commanded by Major General Pak Sun Chol. Following the NKPA collapse, the division had been able to maintain its organization while infiltrating northward from the Pusan Perimeter and raiding the villages for food. The mission was reported to be the occupation and control of the upper Imjin valley as a base for guerrilla operations, with the Majon-ni road junction being designated one of the main objectives.[169] [169] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 8; 1st MarDiv _PIRs 21_ and _22_. Enemy numbers were said to reach a total of 11,000. But that figure, like most Oriental estimates of numbers, had to be taken with the traditional grain of salt.