U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
On the 24th the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines had little
trouble in taking two hills designated as the main Phase 1 objectives.
The 1st Marines on the left sent a tank and infantry patrol into
Hoengsong after artillery preparation and an air strike. Captain Robert
P. Wray, commanding Charlie Company of 1/1 and a platoon of tanks,
entered the ruins of the town only to encounter machine gun and mortar
fire from the hills to the west.[106]
[106] This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Maj
R. P. Wray’s ltr of 6 May 57.
When the antennae were shot off two tanks, Wray directed their 90mm
fire by runner and knocked out the enemy positions. After proceeding
further into the town, he was recalled by his battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, because an aerial observer had
reported that Chinese were waiting to ambush the patrol.
An air strike was directed on them while Wray rescued several survivors
of “Massacre Valley,” northwest of Hoengsong, where a U.S. Army truck
convoy had been ambushed during the recent CCF counterattack. The
patrol returned before the ground had completely thawed. Only a few
hours later a jeep passing over the same road was blown up by a land
mine which killed the driver. This was one of the first object lessons
illustrating the danger from enemy mines which were harmless until the
midday sun thawed out the ground.
Chinese artillery fire from the hills north of Hoengsong accounted for
one Marine KIA and four WIA late that afternoon before counter-battery
fire by 2/11 silenced the enemy. This exchange ended the first phase
of Operation KILLER at dusk on 24 February with all preliminary
objectives seized.[107]
[107] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 2, 5–6.
Air support had been rendered, for the most part, by Fifth Air Force
planes. This gave rise to grumbling by Marine ground forces, who felt
that they had been unnecessarily deprived of their own close air
support. The fact was, however, that U.S. Army and British Commonwealth
troops also preferred Marine air and were outspoken about it. As a
disgruntled Marine ground force officer put it, Marine air was “too
good for our own good.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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