Washington and His Comrades in Arms: A Chronicle of the War of IndependenceWrong, George McKinnon
History
Washington and His Comrades in Arms: A Chronicle of the War of Independence
Wrong, George McKinnon
United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783; Washington, George, 1732-1799 -- Military leadership
On the night of the 29th of August there was clear moonlight, with fog
towards daybreak. A British army of twenty-five thousand men was only
some six hundred yards from the American lines. A few miles from the
shore lay at anchor a great British fleet with, it is to be presumed,
its patrols on the alert. Yet, during that night, ten thousand American
troops were marched down to boats on the strand at Brooklyn and, with
all their stores, were carried across a mile of water to New York. There
must have been the splash of oars and the grating of keels, orders given
in tones above a whisper, the complex sounds of moving bodies of men.
It was all done under the eye of Washington. We can picture that tall
figure moving about on the strand at Brooklyn, which he was the last
to leave. Not a sound disturbed the slumbers of the British. An army
in retreat does not easily defend itself. Boats from the British fleet
might have brought panic to the Americans in the darkness and the
British army should at least have known that they were gone. By seven in
the morning the ten thousand American soldiers were for the time safe
in New York, and we may suppose that the two Howes were asking eager
questions and wondering how it had all happened.
Washington had shown that he knew when and how to retire. Long Island
was his first battle and he had lost. Now retreat was his first great
tactical achievement. He could not stay in New York and so sent at once
the chief part of the army, withdrawn from Brooklyn, to the line of the
Harlem River at the north end of the island. He realized that his shore
batteries could not keep the British fleet from sailing up both the
East and the Hudson Rivers and from landing a force on Manhattan Island
almost where it liked. Then the city of New York would be surrounded by
a hostile fleet and a hostile army. The Howes could have performed this
maneuver as soon as they had a favorable wind. There was, we know, great
confusion in New York, and Washington tells us how his heart was torn by
the distress of the inhabitants. The British gave him plenty of time to
make plans, and for a reason. We have seen that Lord Howe was not only
an admiral to make war but also an envoy to make peace. The British
victory on Long Island might, he thought, make Congress more willing to
negotiate. So now he sent to Philadelphia the captured American General
Sullivan, with the request that some members of Congress might confer
privately on the prospects for peace.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account