Why Men Fight: A method of abolishing the international duelRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
Why Men Fight: A method of abolishing the international duel
Russell, Bertrand
Liberty; Property; Social problems; State, The; War
The civil functions of the State—legislative, administrative, and
judicial—have no very essential connection with the military functions,
and there is no reason why both kinds of functions should normally be
exercised by the same State. There is, in fact, every reason why the
civil State and the military State should be different. The greater
modern States are already too large for most civil purposes, but
for military purposes they are not large enough, since they are not
world-wide. This difference as to the desirable area for the two kinds
of State introduces a certain perplexity and hesitation, when it is not
realized that the two functions have little necessary connection: one
set of considerations points towards small States, the other towards
continually larger States. Of course, if there were an international
Army and Navy, there would have to be some international authority
to set them in motion. But this authority need never concern itself
with any of the internal affairs of national States: it need only
declare the rules which should regulate their relations, and pronounce
judicially when those rules have been so infringed as to call for the
intervention of the international force. How easily the limit of the
authority could be fixed may be seen by many actual examples.
The civil and military State are often different in practice, for many
purposes. The South American Republics are sovereign for all purposes
except their relations with Europe, in regard to which they are subject
to the United States: in dealings with Europe, the Army and Navy of the
United States are their Army and Navy. Our self-governing Dominions
depend for their defense, not upon their own forces but upon our Navy.
Most Governments, nowadays, do not aim at formal annexation of a
country which they wish to incorporate, but only at a protectorate—that
is, civil autonomy subject to military control. Such autonomy is,
of course, in practice incomplete, because it does not enable the
“protected” country to adopt measures which are vetoed by the Power
in military control. But it may be very nearly complete, as in the
case of our self-governing Dominions. At the other extreme, it may
become a mere farce, as in Egypt. In the case of an alliance, there is
complete autonomy of the separate allied countries, together with what
is practically a combination of their military forces into one single
force.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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