Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peace at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and regret' and to 'give Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders at Serajevo[134].' Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go; Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof when he laid stress on the need of the sanction of British public opinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:-- 'I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.'[136] However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] was presented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff, withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet in London immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications', and 'that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference'.[138] This proposal failed, as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm to his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand'.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria and Servia'.[140] No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomatically correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal and double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that 'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of international relations.'[141] V _Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_.