During the early days of November the commander of the Sixth Army came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still too weak to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions, particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to the battle-front. If the attempt to break through south of YPRES was not to be entirely abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the YPRES battle from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at LILLE on the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth Army, west of LILLE; and this was followed by an order on the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by the IV Corps at ARRAS. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for ROUBAIX, which was reached on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the COMINES-YPRES canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there. In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for the offensive north of the COMINES-YPRES canal there were left the II Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there. The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the 10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions.