Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
acquaintance is not usually made with it when the Platonic writings are
studied. Tennemann, for example, did not at all comprehend what was
most important in the Platonic philosophy, and only gathered some of
it together in the form of dry ontological determinations—for that was
what he could comprehend. But it shows the greatest lack of intellect
in a historian of Philosophy only to see in a great philosophic form
whether there is anything yielding profit to himself or not.
What we have thus to deal with in the dialectic of Plato is the
pure thought of reason, from which he very clearly distinguishes
the understanding (διάνοια), (_supra_, p. 47). We may have thoughts
about many things—if indeed, we do have thought at all—but this is
not what Plato means. Plato’s true speculative greatness, and that
through which he forms an epoch in the history of Philosophy, and
hence in the history of the world, lies in the fuller determination
of the Idea; this extension of knowledge is one which some centuries
later constituted the main element in the ferment which took place
in universal history, and in the transformation which the human mind
passed through. This fuller determination may, from what has gone
before, be understood thus: Plato first comprehended the Absolute as
the Being of Parmenides, but as the Universal which, as species, is
also end, _i.e._ which rules, penetrates, and produces the particular
and manifold. Plato, however, had not yet developed this self-producing
activity, and hence often stumbled into an external teleology. As the
union of the preceding principles, Plato further led this Being into
determinateness and into difference, as the latter is contained in
the triad of Pythagorean number-determinations, and expressed the
same in thought. That is, he grasped the Absolute as the unity of
Being and non-being—in Becoming, as Heraclitus says—or of the one and
the many,[30] &c. He further now took into the objective dialectic
of Heraclitus the Eleatic dialectic, which is the external endeavour
of the subject to show forth contradiction, so that in place of an
external changing of things, their inward transition in themselves,
_i.e._ in their Ideas, or, as they are here, in their categories, has
come to pass out of and through themselves. Plato finally set forth the
belief of Socrates, which the latter put forward in regard to the moral
self-reflection of the subject only, as objective, as the Idea, which
is both universal thought and the existent. The previous philosophies
thus do not disappear because refuted by Plato, being absorbed in him.