Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author — David Hume — John Shaqi
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
If we consider the causes of love and hatred, we shall find they are
very much diversified, and have not many things in common. The virtue,
knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love
and esteem; as the opposite qualities, hatred and contempt. The same
passions arise from bodily accomplishments, such as beauty, force,
swiftness, dexterity; and from their contraries; as likewise from the
external advantages and disadvantages of family, possessions, clothes,
nation and climate. There is not one of these objects but what, by
its different qualities, may produce love and esteem, or hatred and
contempt.
From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt
the _quality_ that operates, and the _subject_ on which it is placed.
A prince that is possessed of a stately palace commands the esteem of
the people upon that account; and that, _first_, by the beauty of the
palace; and, _secondly_, by the relation of property, which connects it
with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which
evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one.
'Twould be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred through all
the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility,
and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions. 'Twill be
sufficient to _remark_, in general, that the object of love and hatred
is evidently some thinking person; and that the sensation of the former
passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy. We may also
_suppose_, with some show of probability, _that the cause of both these
passions is always related to a thinking being_, and _that the cause of
the former produces a separate pleasure, and of the latter a separate
uneasiness_.
One of these suppositions, viz. that the cause of love and hatred must
be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produce these
passions, is not only probable, but too evident to be contested. Virtue
and vice, when considered in the abstract; beauty and deformity, when
placed on inanimate objects; poverty and riches, when belonging to a
third person, excite no degree of love or hatred, esteem or contempt,
towards those who have no relation to them. A person looking out at a
window sees me in the street, and beyond me a beautiful palace, with
which I have no concern: I believe none will pretend, that this person
will pay me the same respect as if I were owner of the palace.