To a thoughtful observer at that time, Tennessee’s condition was novel--unlike that of any other State. For while its people had not called for or ratified any Act declaring it no longer a member of the Union, its Governor and Legislature had formed a military league with the enemies of the Union, and in doing this appeared to have done several wrongs. They had exercised a right of sovereignty expressly denied to the several States by the Constitution of the United States, to which the State was certainly subject while in the Union, as it must be allowed to have then been, even upon the admission that an Act of secession when ratified by the people would be valid. And in forming an alliance between Tennessee and the Southern Confederacy and levying troops from the citizens of the State to promote the objects of the Confederacy, they had assumed authority and power not delegated to them by the people, and had also anticipated in effect the very action of the people upon the question of secession, which they professed to admit depended on the will of the people as it might be expressed on the following eighth of June. For by placing the State in military league with the Southern Confederacy and by levying Tennessee troops to carry out the purposes of that league, they had not only put the State into an attitude of _de facto_ hostility to the United States, but also placed the voters in surroundings which would secure a majority of them at the polls for secession; so that the popular will in the matter was practically pushed as far into the back-ground, as if the Governor and Legislature in passing an ordinance of secession, had altogether ignored the existence of the people. The popular vote in the ensuing June--considering all the appliances procured and brought to bear upon it--would not be an election between alternatives, but could only be decided in conformity with the already known will of the Governor and Legislature. In a word, the people were made a mere figure-head in the whole transaction.