A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
I answer, that no generalization amounts to more than an empirical law
when the only proof on which it rests is that of the Method of
Agreement. For it has been seen that by that method alone we never can
arrive at causes. The utmost that the Method of Agreement can do is, to
ascertain the whole of the circumstances common to all cases in which a
phenomenon is produced: and this aggregate includes not only the cause
of the phenomenon, but all phenomena with which it is connected by any
derivative uniformity, whether as being collateral effects of the same
cause, or effects of any other cause which, in all the instances we have
been able to observe, coexisted with it. The method affords no means of
determining which of these uniformities are laws of causation, and which
are merely derivative laws, resulting from those laws of causation and
from the collocation of the causes. None of them, therefore, can be
received in any other character than that of derivative laws, the
derivation of which has not been traced; in other words, empirical laws:
in which light, all results obtained by the Method of Agreement (and
therefore almost all truths obtained by simple observation without
experiment) must be considered, until either confirmed by the Method of
Difference, or explained deductively, in other words accounted for _à
priori_.
These empirical laws may be of greater or less authority, according as
there is reason to presume that they are resolvable into laws only, or
into laws and collocations together. The sequences which we observe in
the production and subsequent life of an animal or a vegetable, resting
on the Method of Agreement only, are mere empirical laws; but though the
antecedents in those sequences may not be the causes of the consequents,
both the one and the other are doubtless, in the main, successive stages
of a progressive effect originating in a common cause, and therefore
independent of collocations. The uniformities, on the other hand, in the
order of superposition of strata on the earth, are empirical laws of a
much weaker kind, since they not only are not laws of causation, but
there is no reason to believe that they depend on any common cause: all
appearances are in favour of their depending on the particular
collocation of natural agents which at some time or other existed on our
globe, and from which no inference can be drawn as to the collocation
which exists or has existed in any other portion of the universe.
§ 6. Our definition of an empirical law including not only those
uniformities which are not known to be laws of causation, but also those
which are, provided there be reason to presume that they are not
ultimate laws; this is the proper place to consider by what signs we may
judge that even if an observed uniformity be a law of causation, it is
not an ultimate but a derivative law.