The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
way in which things are apprehended by us; for when the simple and
indivisible original effort of the will exhibits itself as object in our
cerebral knowledge, it must appear as an ingenious combination of separate
parts, as means and ends of each other, accomplished with wonderful
completeness.
The _unity of that will_, here referred to, which lies beyond the
phenomenon, and in which we have recognised the inner nature of the
phenomenal world, is a metaphysical unity, and consequently transcends the
knowledge of it, _i.e._, does not depend upon the functions of our
intellect, and therefore can not really be comprehended by it. Hence it
arises that it opens to the consideration an abyss so profound that it
admits of no thoroughly clear and systematically connected insight, but
grants us only isolated glances, which enable us to recognise this unity
in this and that relation of things, now in the subjective, now in the
objective sphere, whereby, however, new problems are again raised, all of
which I will not engage to solve, but rather appeal here to the words _est
quadam prodire tenus_, more concerned to set up nothing false or
arbitrarily invented than to give a thorough account of all;—at the risk
of giving here only a fragmentary exposition.
If we call up to our minds and distinctly go through in thought the
exceedingly acute theory of the origin of the planetary system, first put
forth by Kant and later by Laplace, a theory of which it is scarcely
possible to doubt the correctness, we see the lowest, crudest, and
blindest forces of nature bound to the most rigid conformity to law, by
means of their conflict for one and the same given matter, and the
accidental results brought about by this produce the framework of the
world, thus of the designedly prepared future dwelling‐place of
innumerable living beings, as a system of order and harmony, at which we
are the more astonished the more distinctly and accurately we come to
understand it. For example, if we see that every planet, with its present
velocity, can only maintain itself exactly where it actually has its
place, because if it were brought nearer to the sun it would necessarily
fall into it, or if placed further from it would necessarily fly away from
it; how, conversely, if we take the place as given, it can only remain
there with its present velocity and no other, because if it went faster it
would necessarily fly away from the sun, and if it went slower it would
necessarily fall into it; that thus only one definite place is suitable to
each definite velocity of a planet; and if we now see this solved by the
fact that the same physical, necessary, and blindly acting cause which
appointed it its place, at the same time and just by doing so, imparted to
it exactly the only velocity suitable for this place, in consequence of
the law of nature that a revolving body increases its velocity in
proportion as its revolution becomes smaller; and, moreover, if finally we