Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates — Socrates — John Shaqi
Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates
Socrates · en
Upon this Cebes[13] says that he agrees with all else that had been
said, but can not help entertaining doubts of what will become of the
soul when separated from the body, for the common opinion is that it is
dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and no longer exists
anywhere. Socrates, therefore, proposes to inquire into the probability
of the case, a fit employment for him under his present circumstances.
His first argument[14] is drawn from the ancient belief prevalent among
men, that souls departing hence exist in Hades, and are produced again
from the dead. If this be true, it must follow that our souls are there,
for they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and its
truth is confirmed by this, that it is a general law of nature that
contraries are produced from contraries--the greater from the less,
strong from weak, slow from swift, heat from cold, and in like manner
life from death, and vice versa. To explain this more clearly, he
proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to another,
and so undergoes three different states--first, the actual state; then
the transition; and, thirdly, the new state; as from a state of sleep,
by awaking to being awake. In like manner birth is a transition from a
state of death to life, and dying from life to death; so that the soul,
by the act of dying, only passes to another state. If it were not so,
all nature would in time become dead, just as if people did not awake
out of sleep all would at last be buried in eternal sleep. Whence the
conclusion is that the souls of men are not annihilated by death.
Cebes[15] agrees to this reasoning, and adds that he is further
convinced, of its truth by calling to mind an argument used by Socrates
on former occasions, that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence; and if
this is so, the soul must have existed, and had knowledge, before it
became united to the body.
But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied, Socrates[16] proceeds
to enlarge on this, his second argument, drawn from reminiscence. We
daily find that we are carried from the knowledge of one thing to
another. Things perceived by the eyes, ears, and other senses bring up
the thought of other things; thus the sight of a lyre or a garment
reminds us of a friend, and not only are we thus reminded of sensible
objects, but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone, and
have no sensitive existence. For we have formed in our minds an idea of
abstract equality, of the beautiful, the just, the good; in short, of
every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses, for we
use them only in the perception of individual things; whence it follows
that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this life, but must have
had it before, and therefore the soul must have existed before.