"1812" : $b Napoleon I in RussiaVereshchagin, Vasilïĭ Vasilʹevich
History
"1812" : $b Napoleon I in Russia
Vereshchagin, Vasilïĭ Vasilʹevich
Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia; Russia -- History -- 1801-1917
Kutuzof, as has been said, was not alone responsible for Napoleon’s
escape from Russia. The Russian Commander-in-Chief took a thoroughly
sound view of the position of the French Emperor; and in this connection
his conversations with one of his prisoners, a man occupying a high rank
in the administrative branch of the French army, are full of interest.
Kutuzof told him that he had thoroughly studied Napoleon’s character,
and was sure that when once he had crossed the Niemen he would be
tempted to extend his conquests indefinitely. “We have given him plenty
of space to exhaust and dissipate his army, to give strategy, famine,
and frost free play. What blindness is it that has prevented Napoleon
alone from recognizing the trap that was so evident to everybody else?”
The Field-Marshal expressed astonishment at the ease with which Napoleon
had been induced to stay in Moscow and encouraged in his absurd hopes of
concluding an honourable peace, when he was helplessly caught in the
toils.
“Napoleon’s intelligence,” he remarked, “has deteriorated—the whole
campaign shows that. It is a pity he did not think of going further than
Moscow, we would have given him another 5000 versts to conquer.”
He admitted that it would have been hard to imagine anything more
dangerous for Russia than Napoleon’s original plan of remaining in
Smolensk, covering Poland, and renewing the war in the spring. But he
was convinced that the plan did not originate with Napoleon himself, for
he was too much accustomed to short campaigns to devote two whole years
to the conquest of a single empire. “One must know but little of
Napoleon,” said Kutuzof, “to imagine him capable of the patient
execution of an enterprise demanding time, caution, and tedious
elaboration of detail.”
“When I left the Field-Marshal,” says this French officer, “he expressed
the conviction that Bonaparte would inevitably be crushed at the passage
of the Beresina.”
* * * * *
Beyond the Beresina, the retreat became more disastrous than ever. It
was a headlong flight in which there was no longer any pretence of
order. The fugitives behaved, in the most literal sense, like wild
beasts. Muravyof, Fenschaw, Chichagof, and many others affirm that they
saw the French devouring their dead comrades. They often found them in
outhouses seated round a fire on the bodies of the dead, cutting out the
best portions to roast and eat. When, on one occasion, a Russian officer
expressed his horror and disgust, one of these cannibals replied with
perfect equanimity, “Of course this stuff isn’t very nice, but at any
rate it’s better than beastly horse-flesh.”
In the hospital at Minsk the French convalescents, for want of tables,
played cards on the dead and stiffened bodies of their comrades, and the
walls of the room were ornamented with the bodies of the dead dressed in
fantastic costumes and with their faces daubed, by way of jest, with
coal and brick-dust.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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