"1812" : $b Napoleon I in RussiaVereshchagin, Vasilïĭ Vasilʹevich
History
"1812" : $b Napoleon I in Russia
Vereshchagin, Vasilïĭ Vasilʹevich
Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia; Russia -- History -- 1801-1917
The restoration of the kingdom of Poland and the abolition of serfdom
were among the pretexts put forward by Napoleon for his invasion of
Russia. The proposed liberation of the serfs was presumably intended
merely to embarrass his adversary, for Napoleon can scarcely be credited
with any sentimental weakness in favour of liberty for its own sake. He
expected to find in Russia a people ready to throw off its fetters, and
to some extent at least his estimate of the social and political
situation was correct. The masses were ardently longing for freedom, and
the idea of enfranchisement was in the air; but Napoleon failed to
recognize that the means which he employed, instead of encouraging the
people to revolt against their masters, were calculated merely to turn
them into irreconcilable enemies of the invader. There were, it is true,
some disturbances and seditious plots at the beginning of the campaign,
but they were comparatively insignificant; the excesses of the French,
and especially of their allies—Germans, Poles, Italians, and others—soon
provoked a wide-spread revulsion of public opinion. The announcement
that the provinces occupied by the Grande Armée would be retained by
France, and that the nobility and officials would, under no
circumstances, be allowed to return, encouraged the peasantry in some
districts to assist in provisioning the invading army. In many
instances, however, they broke out into open revolt against their
masters, and refused to assist their escape by supplying them with
horses. “Why,” they asked, “should we lend horses to remove our masters’
goods, when Bonaparte is coming to set us free?”
Of the gentry, some, like Engelgard, behaved as true patriots, remaining
on their estates, harassing the French to the utmost of their power, and
frequently meeting death in the service of their country. On the other
hand, we find Prince Bagration tearing the Cross of Honour from the neck
of a certain dignitary, and branding him as a traitor unworthy to serve
his sovereign. Again, in the captured barouche of the French General
Montbrun a note was found, among other papers, giving information as to
the plan of a proposed Russian attack. This note was, in all
probability, delivered to the general by an officer attached to the
Russian head-quarters.
The behaviour of the clergy was, in some cases, extraordinary. The
Bishop of Mogileff and the ecclesiastical dignitaries of Vitebsk in so
far admitted that the conquered provinces no longer belonged to Russia
as to swear allegiance to Napoleon, and issue an order to the priests
directing them to take the same oath, and, in the public prayers in
their churches, to substitute the name of Napoleon for that of
Alexander.[10] Following the example of the Bishop, the priest
Dobrovolsky, and many others, in Holy Mass or the _Te Deums_, omitted to
mention any member of the Russian Imperial Family, while praying for the
health of Napoleon, Emperor of the French and King of Italy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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