"1812" : $b Napoleon I in RussiaVereshchagin, Vasilïĭ Vasilʹevich
History
"1812" : $b Napoleon I in Russia
Vereshchagin, Vasilïĭ Vasilʹevich
Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia; Russia -- History -- 1801-1917
Davout was put at one time under Murat’s command. He submitted to his
orders, but most unwillingly, and although he swallowed his wrath, he
ceased all direct communication with the Emperor. Napoleon, however,
ordered him to send in his reports as before, for Murat’s despatches
were hopeless. This was just what Davout wanted, and from that time
forth he ceased to recognize the authority of the King of Naples. The
extent of their jealousy may be judged from the fact that in an
engagement one of Davout’s batteries refused to fire on the orders of
Murat. The commander of the battery urged the Marshal’s own orders in
justification of his refusal; he had been told to take orders from no
one but Davout under pain of losing his command.
[Illustration: _Marshal Davout._]
The next day the two rivals had a lively altercation in Napoleon’s
presence. The King accused the Duke of obstinate resistance to his
wishes, and with secret enmity towards himself, an enmity, he averred,
that had its origin in Egypt. He went so far as to propose a settlement
of the quarrel man to man, urging that the army should not be allowed to
suffer through their private differences. Davout, on the other hand,
attacked the King furiously for his wanton recklessness, and painted a
lively picture of the disorder that reigned in the advance-guard of the
army. “I must admit,” said he, according to Ségur, “that the Russians
are effecting their retreat in the most admirable order. They halt
wherever they find it convenient instead of consulting the wishes of our
boastful friend Murat. They select their positions so well, and defend
them so skilfully, with an eye to the forces at their disposal, and the
time they wish to gain, that their tactics must have been carefully
thought out long ago.
“They never abandon a position until it becomes untenable. At night they
turn in early and leave only as many troops under arms as are absolutely
necessary for the defence of their positions and for allowing the rest
of the troops an opportunity for sleep and refreshment.
“But the King, instead of profiting by this excellent example, takes no
account of time or of the position and strength of the enemy. He is
always appearing in the skirmishing line, prancing up and down in front
of the enemy or trying to worry them on the flanks, losing his temper,
yelling himself hoarse with orders, wasting cartridges and ammunition,
men and horses, for no reason whatever, and keeping all the troops under
arms until late into the night.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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