The government was coöperating energetically in the efforts to strengthen still more the monetary position of the country. At the same time naval construction was being pushed forward on a scale that betokened the very presence of war. And yet in the midst of the oppressive conviction of impending conflict, there was no word in the courts and parliaments of Europe save of peace. Guns were bought, ships were built, armies were equipped, practice maneuvers were executed, nations were impoverished, all for the preservation of peace. But the limit had been passed at last. War was cheaper than peace. So war it was to be, in everybody’s opinion. The absence of specific cause made no difference. It could be developed in a hundred ways at a few hours’ notice. There was at least the hope of a general disarmament and the real peace of recuperation after the cataclysm was over. Many people who believed in the inevitability of the long-threatened struggle were inclined to look upon the situation in the cold light of this philosophy. About the middle of August, France began an energetic series of diplomatic protests against the continued occupation of Egypt by Great Britain. It was instantly surmised that this was the signal of the approaching crisis. Russia joined in the dissent, and the tone of the objections sent to the Court of St. James was distinctly aggressive. Europe made up its mind that there was to be an autumn campaign. It was the design of the aggressors apparently to make the contest short and sharp. The approach of winter, which would greatly interfere with military operations on the Continent, might be an added influence to induce Germany and Austria to keep hands off until France and Russia had an opportunity to overthrow the naval supremacy of Great Britain. The issue of a conflict between England on the one hand and France and Russia on the other, would, of course, be decided principally upon the sea. The situation became extremely critical. Great Britain, avoiding the responsibility for provoking hostilities, took advantage at first of diplomatic red tape. Delay was sought, and the diplomatic agents of the protesting governments developed impatience. They showed signs of becoming peremptory in their demands, and there was vague talk of an ultimatum from France to England.