A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Ancient and Mediæval PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
In the second place, _conception gets a new value_. What was conception
to Socrates? It was the common content of opinions and perceptions;
it was the universal that was developed inductively out of many
particulars. Socrates brought many particulars together in order to
reveal their common qualities. The abode of conceptions was to Socrates
the half-formed individual opinions and experiences in which conception
lay, as in an envelope; and the conversation was needed to bring it
forth. The concept to Socrates was the logical “nature” of perceptions.
But now since Plato admitted the relative reality of all perceptions,
he was obliged to look elsewhere to account for conceptions. If
the conceptions are true reality, they cannot be the common quality
in opinions, nor the logical “nature” of changing perceptions. The
true conception cannot be contained in the perception. Accordingly
the conception must exist in an incorporeal world and possess an
independent reality. The concepts are hypostasized by Plato. They
become Ideas. Thus the Socratic concept became the Platonic Idea,
and _for the first time in European thought, reality is conceived
as immaterial_. The conceptual world grows under Plato’s hands to be
“other than” the perceptual world, and this was his first step beyond
Socrates. The conceptual world is the perfect reality that cannot be
contained in any material thing nor in the sum of all material things.
The immaterial Ideas are the object of thought, as nature phenomena
are the objects of perception. Ideas are not the abstractions of
perceptions, for the process of thought is not an analysis nor an
abstraction, but an intuition of reality presented in single instances.
Ideas are the reality of which perceptions are the copies or shadows.
Perceptions do not contain the truth. They are only the suggestions or
promptings by which the soul bethinks itself of the Ideas. Material
things merely hint to the soul of the existence of the Ideas.
It is important in this connection to point out that Plato’s conception
of immateriality is not to be taken as what we mean in modern times
by the spiritual or psychical; for, according to Plato, our psychical
functions belong to the world of Becoming, just as the functions of our
body and other perceptual things belong to it. Besides, even the Ideas
of sense qualities have reality. Plato does not identify the human
mind with the incorporeal world of Ideas, nor does he make the modern
dualistic division of the world into mind and matter. The immaterial
world is “other than” the world of perception, and bears the relation
to the material world of the unchanging to the changing, of the simple
to the manifold, of Being to Becoming.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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