Ockam was the natural precursor of his fellow countryman John Locke, and the English empirical school. Individual things have the reality of original Forms, for they come to us intuitively. Our ideas are only signs of them. This is a relation of the “first intention.” As individual ideas are related to individual things, so general ideas are related to individual ideas. This is the relation of the “second intention.” The general idea referring thus indirectly to an individual thing is therefore arbitrary and capricious. Real science deals with things intuitively observed; rational science only with the relations between ideas. Nevertheless real science deals only with an inner world, even if its material is intuitively known. Intuitions are only representatives of the real world. How much less real must the world of rational science then be, since it presupposes these inner intuitions of real science. The universal, therefore, has no reality. It is a name, a sign of many things, a term. Only the individual is real. =After Ockam.= William of Ockam was the last schoolman. When his doctrine of terminism was united with Augustine’s powerful doctrine of the will,――forming an extreme individualism,――the glimmering of the dawn of modern times appears. The movement was made still stronger by the study of the history of development psychologically, and it became a kind of idealism of the inner life. Already, too, there were beginning investigations in natural science, based upon empirical study. Modern subjectivism was at hand; scholasticism had run its course. The representatives of the scholastic philosophy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries forgot the principle of the Classic Schoolmen and became mere commentators of the leaders of the tradition to which they belonged. Their verbal subtleties were too refined to be understood. The efforts of Nicolas Cusanus to bring secular science under a system of scholastic mysticism only promoted the modern movement. Cusanus therefore belongs to the next period, and of him we shall subsequently hear. INDEX Abdera 107, 119. _See_ Atomists. Abelard life of, 363; his conceptualism, 364; his rationalism, 365–367. Academy, the what it was, 124; after the death of Plato, 166; and Aristotle, 169–171; Older, Middle, and New, 220, 221; the skepticism of, 266–268; eclecticism in, 270. Adams, G. B. _Civilization during the Middle Ages_, 374 n. Adamson, Robert _The Development of Greek Philosophy_ quoted, 255. Ænesidemus Skeptic, 268. Agrippa Skeptic, 268, 269. Albertus Magnus _See_ Bollstaedt. Alcidamus Sophist, 68. Alcuin 349, 350. Alexander of Hales 379. Alexandria a centre of Hellenism, 215; in the Middle Ages, 282. Alexandrian School of neo-Platonism 290–298. Ammonius Saccas 290, 314. _Anamnesis_ 147–149.