A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
In his denial of the existence of innate ideas, in his use of the
formula that “nothing is in the intellect that has not been first in
the sense,” or in his employment of the figure of the “white piece
of paper,” Locke does not intend to state anything further than that
the mind is free. He merely means that the individual starts without
trammels and prejudices. He does not mean that the mind is completely
passive and at the mercy of its environment, as his French followers
interpreted him. Locke is a sensationalist, but he does not belong to
that class who believe that our mental states are merely translated
sensations, and that the mind itself is merely passive. He believes
that the mind does not create its ideas, but that they are presented
to it. The mind has original powers upon which it can reflect. The mind
can operate with its ideas and make them into compounds. Thus one must
read Locke’s _Essay_ to the end to get his double point of view. In the
second and third books he frequently discusses the contents of the mind
as if the mind were passive, in the manner of modern psychologists. In
the fourth book he develops an epistemology on the assumption that the
mind is active and free.
=Locke’s Psychology.= The second and third books of the _Essay_ are
a discussion of the empirical sources of our ideas. One notes the
Cartesian dualism of mind and matter in the background. All ideas
have their source either externally in the impressions upon the bodily
senses, or internally in the operations of the mind itself. The sources
of ideas are either sensations or reflections, or, as Locke calls
them, “outer and inner perceptions.” Locke also calls them “simple
ideas,” being the units out of which the complex ideas are constructed.
We understand easily enough what Locke means by sensations, but
“reflections” is a word peculiar to him, which has not been taken up by
philosophy. He means by “reflections” a consciousness of the machinery
of the mind. We are, that is to say, conscious of our willing, loving,
remembering, etc. As to the order of their appearance in the mind,
the sensations are prior to the reflections and are the occasion
for the appearance of the reflections. The reflections are not the
process of transmitting the sensations, but they are the later and
mechanical transmutation of the sensations. It is important to note
that throughout Locke’s psychological analysis, he regards the mind as
passive, even with respect to the ideas of reflection. The reflections,
as faculties of the mind, are dependent on the sensations, and both
sensations and reflections make impressions upon a passive mind.
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