A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
2. The realm of things-in-themselves is not to Kant the realm of
knowledge. By things-in-themselves Kant distinctly does not mean
things-for-us, not material bodies, not nature objects. It must be
remembered that Kant has plundered the material realm of the dualist.
The things-in-themselves which are left behind as a residuum lie
outside all sense-perception and so beyond all knowledge. A divine
intelligence might have the things-in-themselves as objects of
knowledge, but not we human beings. The thing-in-itself is the unknown
and unknowable. But if this realm of things-in-themselves is so
absolutely independent of us that we cannot in any way know it, how
can we say that it exists? Kant replies to this: while we cannot say
_what_ a thing-in-itself is, we are obliged to say _that_ it is. For
although beyond even our sense-perception, it stands as a necessary
postulate to perception, as a mere “problem.” Kant also calls
things-in-themselves Noumena, and regards them as “limiting concepts”
to the divine non-sensuous intelligence. Their reality is as little to
be denied as affirmed.
3. Kant pointed out that between or beside the realm of subjectivity
and that of the things-in-themselves lies the realm of human knowledge,
which we in our every-day speech call physical nature, and to which he
gave the name “the world of phenomena” or “the world of experience.”
The subjective world is apprehended by the individual alone, the world
of things-in-themselves is known by no human being, but the world of
phenomena is the common object of knowledge of humanity. Phenomena are
not things-in-themselves, but things-for-us; they are physical nature,
an interrelated totality for us. They constitute not absolute reality,
but a reality relative to us. Phenomena are experiences in their
relations; such related experiences are objects of knowledge, and in
their thoroughly organized and systematic form they constitute nature.
Thus the dualism which we ordinarily meet, like the “two world” theory
of Wolff, has many differences from this critical theory of Kant with
its threefold divisions of one world. One of the most important is that
in Kant’s theory the correspondence between states of consciousness
and reality has disappeared. Reality touches consciousness only at
one point,――at that point where sensations arise. Sensations mark
the boundary between unknown reality and conscious life. On the side
of reality all is darkness; on the side of conscious life all is the
creation of our complex synthetic activity. With the boundary line of
sensation as a base, the two realms extend in opposite directions. In
value the realm of our conscious life is only relative; that of reality
or things-in-themselves is absolute.
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