A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
If we start from the heart of existence――the active Ego――the world
spreads out before us as a system of reason which has been created by
the activity of the Ego. On this account Fichte’s philosophy has been
called subjective idealism. In such a scheme of things there is no
place for the Kantian thing-in-itself. All Being is only an extended
product of the active Ego and the object of its knowledge. The Ego acts
because it must, and then reflects upon its activity. Its knowledge of
its activity is in grades from sense-perception to complete knowledge.
Now Kant had referred sensations to the thing-in-itself as their source.
But this is unnecessary, since sensations are only the activity of
the Ego. Sensations are the groundless, free act of the Ego. They
appear to be “given,” because they appear to be foreign and coming
from without. They are, however, only the lowest form of the activity
of the personality――they are unconscious self-limitation of the Ego.
The sensations have no ground that determines them, but as the lowest
form of the activity of the Ego they are absolutely free. Thus the
thing-in-itself becomes superfluous, since it is not necessary to
account for sensations.
The next task for Fichte is to rethink the series of necessitated
events of physical nature. If we will look at these events from the
point of view of the willing Ego, which is reality, they will be seen
to be products of purposive action. Together they will make a world
of connected rational activities rather than a mechanical system. The
necessity in nature is not causal, but teleological. It is not the
necessity linking the series of events together, but rather the linking
of each event to the acting Ego, and thus the connecting of the whole
series. Take the idealist’s position and this illuminating thought will
come to you: a thing is not because something else is, but in order
that something else may be. As moral beings we have tasks. As moral
beings we are the impersonation of duty, and duty is reality. These
phenomena that so trouble us because we think them necessitated are
only contingent upon the performance of our duty. The existence of
one thing is not to be explained by the existence of another, but by
the existence of me, an Ego. Phenomena are little steps toward great
ends. When I rethink the world I see no causal relationship, but the
teleological means for the achievement of purposes by striving souls.
History and nature――these are the material created by human beings for
their own activity. We not only create our human drama, but we create
also the stage upon which it is performed. Being is not the cause of
Doing, but Being is created for the sake of Doing. Whatever is, is to
be explained by what ought to be. “The world is the theatre of moral
action.” “Nature is the sensible material of duty.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account