A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern PhilosophyCushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy
A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy
Cushman, Herbert Ernest
Philosophy -- History
=The Relation of the Occasionalists and Spinoza to Descartes.= The
development of the doctrines of the Occasionalists and Spinoza from
Descartes was an attempt to make clear the conception of _substance_.
Since substance was the most important scholastic category, it is easy
to see why Spinoza’s teaching became thoroughly scholastic. Descartes
had used the term “substance” in a very loose way to apply to God
as infinite, and to minds and bodies as finite. He speaks of God as
the only substance, and yet of consciousness and bodies as created
substances. Such ambiguity must be overcome, if a philosophy which
prided itself on making everything “clear and distinct” was to stand.
Descartes had fallen short of justifying his attempt to put metaphysics
completely upon a mathematical basis, although this had been his
original problem. The obscurity of the spiritual world still remained,
because Descartes had left the concept of the spiritual substance
undefined. The world of the spirit was still an unknown country. The
spiritual substance had not been made clear and distinct, and there
still remained the ontological problem of the relation between mind
and matter, and the psychological problem of the relation between the
individual soul and its body.
Descartes had, however, defined clearly the concept of the substance
of matter――the substance with which the natural scientist works. He had
accomplished this, to be sure, by destroying the essential distinctions
between material things. A “thing” is essentially a substance in
which many qualities inhere, _e. g._ a piece of sugar having whiteness,
sweetness, etc. Material substances were alike in that all were
essentially extension. All else besides extension in any particular
finite thing was a modification of extension. A lump of sugar was
essentially the same as a lump of salt in that both were extension; the
saltness, sweetness, etc., were secondary. Now this makes the nature
of bodies very clear; and Descartes proposed to reduce the substance
of the states of mind to the same clearness, but he did not do it.
He was interested in natural science and he developed his rationalism
only with reference to matter. Bodies are parts of space or corpuscles,
which are mathematically infinitely divisible, but perceptually are not
further divisible. As far as he went, Descartes was clear enough.
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