_Such an image may, in fact, appear._ It may appear in the cases of halting and partial recognition that we referred to on p. 181; but it need not necessarily appear even there; its intervention is, indeed, as rare as the third type of mental connection, the clean-cut succession of p. 161. You will perhaps get at the heart of the matter most easily if we lay down, at once, the general principle that _no imaginal process or complex of imaginal processes is in its own right a memory-idea_. Even if the simple images which compose it are different from sensations (p. 77), it must still be called a complex image, and nothing more; not an idea of memory. A complex of imaginal processes becomes, _is made into_, a memory-idea by an attendant feeling of familiarity; just exactly as a perception, a complex of sensory processes, is made into a recognition of something by the same feeling of familiarity. So that _an idea, in order to be a memory-idea, must bear the memory-label_; and the label will be either the sense-feeling of familiarity proper, or else some weaker and more fleeting feeling of the ‘of-course’ kind. It is true, again, that an idea which has lived through this history may be taken _as_ a memory-idea when the label has dropped away; but even then it is a memory-idea, not in its own right, but in right of the brain-habit behind it. No group of images, taken out of its mental setting or removed from the directive pressure of a brain-habit, can be known as a memory; it might be hallucination or dream or imagination or anything else; it is just a group of images.