grouping or ‘convergence’ of associative tendencies (p. 158). We do not hesitate to describe a man as ‘wholly lacking in imagination,’ though we should look upon a total lack of memory as a sign of mental incompetence; and the common phrase brings out, well enough, this personal or idiosyncratic character of the idea of imagination. § 45. =The Pattern of Imagination.=—Imagination, like memory, may occur in the state of primary or of secondary attention. In the former case we call it receptive, in the latter case constructive imagination. What happens in =receptive imagination= is, in principle, very simple. We are confronted by new perceptions or ideas, and we supplement these experiences by _complex images of the appropriate kind_. We read, for instance, a traveller’s account of an African forest, and we picture the forest as we read; we receive the score of a new song, and the melody sings itself to us as we run our eye over the printed notes; we stand upon an historic site, and rehearse in image the scenes that it has witnessed. A certain definite direction is given to our ideas by the presented stimuli; then the ideas, as they come in their predetermined order, are supplemented in this imaginal way. The characteristic _feeling of strangeness_, in such cases, is often interfused with an experience which might, at first sight, seem incompatible with it; the _’feeling’ of our own concernment_ in the imagined situation. We have a natural tendency to feel ourselves into what we perceive or imagine. As we read about the forest, we may, as it were, _become_ the explorer; we feel for ourselves the gloom, the silence, the humidity, the oppression, the sense of lurking danger; everything is strange, but it is to us that the strange experience has come. We are told of a shocking accident, and we gasp and shrink and feel nauseated as we imagine it; we are told of some new and delightful fruit, and our mouth waters as if we were about to taste it. This tendency to feel oneself _into_ a situation is called =empathy=,—on the analogy of sympathy, which is feeling _together with_ another; and empathic ideas are psychologically interesting, because they are the converse of perceptions: their core is imaginal, and their context is made up of sensations, the kinæsthetic and organic sensations that carry the empathic meaning. Like the feeling of strangeness, they are characteristic of imagination. In memory, their place is taken by the _imitative_ experiences, which repeat over again certain phases of the original situation.