disposal for scientific analysis, but also shows that _an action, even
in its simplest form, will vary with every shift of emphasis in the
suggestion_ (p. 213) _which calls it forth_.
Let us look, now, at the =reaction times=, and see if they can be
turned to scientific account. So many experiments have been made
that we know the average times of reaction, both sensory and motor,
to light, sound and touch; and we also know what their average
constancy or regularity will be, if the reactor keeps his attitude to
the experiments unchanged. The times themselves, and the numerical
statement of their constancy, may therefore be used as indexes to the
type of reaction, sensory or motor, and to the stability or instability
of the reactor’s attitude. _They embody, as if in short-hand, the
results of oft-repeated observation_, and they may henceforth take
the place of direct psychological observation when we are asked to
decide on the type of reaction or the reliability of the reactor. The
psychological observation must, however, come first; we cannot take the
reaction-times of children or South Sea Islanders, and at once put them
down as sensory or motor or mixed; we must know what the reactors were
trying to do, how they understood the instructions given them.
§ 57. =The Degeneration of Action: From Impulsive to Reflex.=—We
have now to trace the course of impulsive action, downward to
automatic, and upward to deliberative action. If we start out on the
downward path, we note that impulsive action by frequent repetition
degenerates, first, to what is called =sensorimotor= or =ideomotor
action=: sensorimotor, if the object is still _perceived_, as it is in
the impulsive action proper (p. 235), and ideomotor, if the perception
is replaced by an _idea_ of object. Here the predetermination is a
nervous set without any mental correlates; the intention to move has
dropped away; and the idea of result is, so to say, incorporated in
the perception or idea of object; so that movement follows at once
upon this perception or idea. When we sit down at table, for instance,
we take up our knife _as_ a thing to cut food with; and when we are
dressing, we close our fingers round a button _as_ a thing to fasten
a garment with; the movements that we make are predetermined, but not
premeditated; the actions are sensorimotor. When, again, it occurs to
us, in the midst of our reading, that the mail must have arrived, we
ideate the packet of letters _as_ something to be fetched from the
mail-box; and when, as we watch the shower, it occurs to us that the
cellar hatchway is open, we ideate the hatchway _as_ something to be
closed; we act without further thought, and the actions are ideomotor.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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