Consider, first, the attitude of =expectation=. It is not difficult to devise experiments which shall set up in the observer an expectant attitude; thus, in a very simple case, the experimenter might hang a weight by a cord to the ceiling, tie a loose piece of string to the cord, and light the end of the string; the observer would then watch the progress of the flame, _expecting_ that it will presently reach the cord, burn that, and so cause the weight to fall to the floor. What are the processes in the observer’s mind as he watches? You will naturally think of an image; the observer will imagine the fall of the weight. Not necessarily; not even usually; _the image of expectation must go the same road as the image of recognition_ (p. 184). _Ordinarily, expectation consists simply of kinæsthetic and organic sensations_; sometimes there are verbal ideas; only occasionally is there an image. If the experience is novel, _the sensations are likely to be tinged by feeling_; there is a trace of anxiety, of apprehension. Analysis reveals nothing more. We have, then, in expectation a _directed_ experience; the perception of the flaming string acts as a suggestion, turning the observer’s mental processes into a single channel. The kinæsthetic and organic sensations derive in part from the bodily attitude of _attention_: tense muscles, inhibited breathing, adjustment of the organ of sight. Yet the observer is not merely attentive; the suggestion, the determination is there; and the sensations derive in part from that. They are _contextual_ processes, and carry the meaning that ‘so-and-so is going to happen.’ They are therefore precisely like the ‘sensations of intended movement’ that characterise the motor reaction (p. 241); we might even call them, following that analogy, ‘sensations of future occurrence.’ All the same, they are, if we regard them as processes, just kinæsthetic and organic sensations, held together in a certain pattern by the perceptive suggestion; expectation shows nothing unique or ultimate behind or beyond them. In course of time, if the situation is repeated, the feeling of anxiety fades away, and the experience becomes indifferent. With still further repetition, the ‘sensations of future occurrence’ also drop away; the suggestion from the flaming string then sets the organism, automatically, for the coming event; and the set has no mental correlates whatever.