The three just mentioned, belief-doubt-disbelief, belong to the class of =intellectual= sentiments. An attempt has been made to examine them under experimental conditions; with the result that they prove to be of rare occurrence; that they are characterised in different minds—as might perhaps be expected, from the complexity of the situation—by different complexes, by the kinæsthesis of bodily attitude, by internal speech, by the interplay of visual imagery; and that they are ordinarily replaced by the feeling-attitudes of certainty and uncertainty. The mental patterns of belief and disbelief turn out to be the same; and this result is psychologically reasonable; for the positive and negative of the terms are logical, an affair of meaning; so far as experience goes, disbelief is as positive as belief. Hence it is natural that both of them should be represented in feeling-attitude by the same ‘certainty,’ Another group of intellectual sentiments, less often named, but familiar to everyone who has set to work seriously to master a new writer or a new subject, consists of _agreement, obscurity and contradiction_. These have not, to the author’s knowledge, been subjected to analysis; indeed, the present paragraphs can do little more than catalogue a few of the more obvious sentiments; the experiences are difficult to induce, and their detailed study is yet to come. In the sphere of the =moral= or =social= sentiments, we have such opposites as trust-distrust, honour-dishonour, justice-injustice. There is always a suspensive sentiment, corresponding with oscillation of judgement, though its name can be made only approximative; we may, perhaps, speak of trust-trial-distrust, honour-ambiguity-dishonour, justice-equivocalness-injustice; think yourself into concrete situations, and you will get the meaning of the terms! Social situations are, however, of great practical importance; and we usually meet them, not by a sentiment, but by some emotion based upon instinctive tendencies; vanity, shame, pride, sympathy are emotions of this sort. The same thing holds of =religious= situations. Triads like faith-perplexity-denial, communion-insecurity-estrangement point to the state of secondary attention; but in general the religious situation sets up an emotion.