Mr. Clay noticed this singular paper in a communication over his own name, which was published in the National Intelligencer reviewing briefly the controversy, stating the grounds of his action in relation to it, and established the two following principles: ‘that the house had a right to know through its organ, the specific motion which a member intends making before he undertakes to argue it at large, and that it reserves to itself the exercise of the power of determining whether it will consider it at the particular time when offered, prior to his thus proceeding to argue it.’ These principles have subsequently formed the rule in the house in similar cases, the operation of which has tended, in no small degree, to promote the interests of the country, by restraining within proper bounds the freedom of debate. On the first of June, the president despatched to the house a message, containing a summary statement of our grievances demanding reparation, narrating the various pacific and often repeated attempts of the United States to adjust all existing difficulties with Great Britain, remarking the cold indifference or haughty repulse with which the latter had invariably met the amicable advances of the former, and recommending to the early consideration of congress the question whether the United States should ‘continue passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or opposing force to force in defence of their natural rights, should commit a just cause into the hands of the almighty disposer of events.’ An ‘immediate appeal to _arms_’ was recommended in a report of the committee on foreign relations, to whom the message was referred, on the eighteenth, and the act declaring war passed both houses of congress the same day, and on the nineteenth Mr. Madison issued his proclamation, declaring hostilities as actually commenced. On the sixth of July congress adjourned, to assemble on the first Monday in November.