3. Infinite perfection being implied in the idea of a God, as has been proved under the last answer, it is certain that it cannot belong to more than one; for as it implies that this perfection is boundless, so it denotes that he sets bounds to the perfections of all others; therefore, if there are more Gods than one, their perfections must be limited, and consequently that which is not infinite is not God. And as infinite perfection implies in it all perfection, so it cannot be divided among many, for then no being, that has only a part thereof, could be said to be thus perfect; therefore, since there is but one that is so, it follows that there is no other God besides him. 4. Since omnipotency is a divine attribute, there can be but one almighty being, and therefore but one God; which will farther appear, if we consider, that if there were more Gods than one, all of them must be said to be able to do all things, and then the same individual power, that is exerted by one, must be exerted by another, than which nothing is more absurd. And it will also follow, that he, who cannot do that which is said to be done by another, is not almighty, or able to do all things, and consequently that he is not God. 5. There is but one being, who has an absolute sovereign will, who, though he can controul all others, is himself subject to no controul; who has a natural right to give laws to all who are his subjects, but is subject to none himself; for absolute dominion and subjection are as opposite as light and darkness. Two persons may as well be said to give being to each other, as to have a right to give laws to each other. Moreover, if there were more Gods than one, then there would be a confusion in the government of the world; for whatever one decrees, another may reverse; or whatever is done by one, the contrary might be done by the other, for that is the consequence from a sovereignty of will. And as there might be opposite things commanded, or forbidden, pursuant to the different wills of a plurality of gods, so the same thing, with respect to those who are under an obligation to yield obedience, would be both a sin and a duty, and the same persons would be both condemned and justified for the same action.