As for Arminius, and his followers, they have very much insisted on a supposition, which they have advanced, that the universal corruption of human nature arises only from imitation. In answer to which, though I will not deny but that the progress and increase of sin, in particular persons, may be very much owing to the pernicious example of others, with whom they are conversant; yet it seems very absurd to assign this, as the first reason thereof; for it may easily be observed, that this corruption of nature, or disposition to sin, is visible in children, before they are capable of being drawn aside, by the influence of bad examples; and indeed, their being corrupted thereby, is rather the effect, than the cause of this first propensity that there is in nature to sin; and it would soon appear, that, if they never saw any thing but what is excellent or worthy to be imitated in those, under whose care they are, they would soon discover themselves, notwithstanding, prone to the contrary vices. And we may as well suppose, that wisdom, or holiness, takes its rise from imitation, in a natural way, as that sin, or folly, does so: But nothing is more common, than for children to be very degenerate from their parents. And whatever attempts are used to instil principles of virtue into them, it is nothing else, but striving against the stream of corrupt nature, unless the grace of God interpose, and do that which imitation can never be the cause of. Therefore we must take some other method to account for this corruption of nature, and at the same time, maintain, that the soul is from God, by immediate creation, which, though it be not so plainly contained in scripture, as other articles of faith are, yet scripture seems not to be wholly silent as to this matter; especially when God says, _Behold, all souls are mine_, Ezek. xviii. 4. and elsewhere, which is more express to this purpose, God speaks of the _souls that he made_, or created, Isa. lvii. 16. and the apostle, for this reason, styles him, _The Father of spirits_, Heb. xii. 9. and that in such a sense, as is opposed to _the fathers of the flesh_; therefore, taking this for granted, the difficulty which will recur upon us, which we are to account for, is, how can the soul, that comes out of God’s immediate hand, be the subject of moral evil? To assert, that it is created guilty of Adam’s first sin, or under an obligation to suffer that degree of punishment, which is due to it, is not inconsistent with the divine perfections, as will farther appear, when, under a following head, we consider what this punishment is: but to suppose that it is created by God impure, or with an inclination, or propensity to sin, cannot well be reconciled with the holiness of God.