(2.) When conditions are insisted on, in human covenants, it is generally supposed, that though it be possible for the person, that enjoins them, to assist, and enable him, who is under this obligation, to perform them, yet he will not give him that assistance; for, if he does, the contract can hardly be reckoned conditional, but absolute: thus if a creditor should tell an insolvent debtor, that he will discharge him, provided he pays the debt, and, at the same time, gives him to understand that he will supply him with a sum of money, that shall enable him to do it, this is altogether the same as though he had discharged him, without any conditional demand of payment. This I cannot but mention, because there are some persons, who speak of faith, as a condition of the covenant of grace, and, at the same time, take it for granted, that it is not in our own power to perform it: nevertheless, since God has promised that he will work it in us, they conclude it to be conditional; whereas such a promise as this would render the covenant absolute, or, at least, not conditional, in the same sense, in which human covenants are, and only infer what we do not deny, that there is a necessary connexion between that grace, which God will enable us to perform, and salvation, which he has promised in this covenant. (3.) When any thing is promised to another, on condition that he do what is enjoined on him, it is generally supposed that it is a dubious and uncertain matter whether this condition shall be fulfilled, and the promise take place; or, as I may express it, every condition contains not a necessary, but an uncertain connexion between the promised advantage, and the duty enjoined, and that for this reason, because all human covenants depend on the power and will of men, who are under conditional engagements to perform what is demanded therein; and these are supposed to be mutable and defective, and, as far as they are so, the performance of the condition may be reckoned dubious; and he that made the promise is liable to the same uncertainty, whether he shall make it good or no. This will hardly be denied, by those who defend the other side of the question, who, in explaining the nature of human liberty, generally suppose, that every one, who acts freely, might do the contrary; therefore they must, from hence, conclude, that, if the performing the conditions of a covenant be the result of man’s free will, it is possible for him not to perform them, and therefore it must be a matter of uncertainty, whether a person, who promises a reward upon the performance of these conditions, will confer it or no. But, however this may be applied to human covenants, we are not to suppose that faith, or any other grace, is, in this respect, a condition of the covenant of grace, as though God’s conferring the blessings promised therein were dependent on the will of man, as determining itself to the exercise of these graces; in this respect, we cannot but deny the