3. These two natures are distinct; united but not confounded. This is asserted, in opposition to an old exploded heresy, which was maintained by some, who, to avoid the error of Nestorius, and his followers, went into the other extreme,[121] and asserted, that the divine and human nature of Christ were confounded, or blended together, after the similitude of things that are mixed together in a natural or artificial way, whereby the composition is of a different nature from the parts of which it is compounded, by which means they debase his Godhead, and advance his manhood; or rather, instead of supposing him to be both God and man, they do, in effect, say, he is neither God nor man. The main foundation, as I apprehend, of this absurd and blasphemous notion, was, that they could not conceive how he could have a divine and human understanding and will, without asserting, with Nestorius, that there were two persons in the Mediator, whereby they split against one rock, while endeavouring to avoid another. And to fence against both extremes, the fathers, in the council of Chalcedon, explained the doctrine in words to this purpose: That the two natures of Christ were indivisibly and inseparably united, without supposing that one was changed into the other, or confounded with it. Therefore we must consider, that though these two natures are united, yet each of them retains its respective properties, as much as the soul and body of man do, though united together, which is the best similitude by which this can be illustrated, though I do not suppose that, in all respects, it answers it. Thus, in one nature, Christ had all the fulness of the Godhead, and in nothing common with us; nothing finite, derived, or dependent, or any other way defective. In his other nature, he was made in all things like unto us, sin only excepted: in this nature, he was born in time, and did not exist from all eternity, and increased in knowledge, and other endowments, proper thereunto. In one nature, he had a comprehensive knowledge of all things; in the other, he knew nothing but by communication, or derivation, and with those other limitations that finite wisdom is subject to. In one nature he had an infinite sovereign will; in the other, he had such a will as the creature has, which though it was not opposite to his divine will, yet its conformity thereunto was of the same kind with that which is in perfect creatures; so that though we do not say that his human will was the same with his divine, as to the essential properties thereof; yet it may be said to be the same, in a moral sense, as conformed thereunto, in like manner, as the will of man is said to be subjected to the will of God.