A Body of Divinity, Vol. 3 (of 4): Wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are explained and defended, being the substance of several lectures on the Assembly's Larger CatechismRidgley, Thomas
Religion
A Body of Divinity, Vol. 3 (of 4): Wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are explained and defended, being the substance of several lectures on the Assembly's Larger Catechism
_James._ If there be any thing convincing in it, I confess I do not
perceive it. I admit with Mr. _Charnock_, “That Christ was ‘made sin’
_as if he had_ sinned all the sins of men; and we are ‘made
righteousness,’ _as if we had_ not sinned at all.” What more is
necessary to abide by the obvious meaning of the words? To go further
must be to maintain that Christ’s being _made sin_ means that he was
literally rendered wicked, and that his being _made a curse_ is the
same thing as his being punished for it according to his deserts.
Brother Peter, I am sure, does not believe this shocking position: but
he seems to think there is a medium between his being treated _as if
he were_ a sinner, and his _being one_. If such a medium there be, I
should be glad to discover it: at present it appears to me to have no
existence.
Brother Peter will not suspect me, I hope, of wishing to depreciate
his judgment, when I say, that he appears to me to be attached to
certain terms without having sufficiently weighed their import. In
most cases I should think it a privilege to learn of him: but in some
things I cannot agree with him. In order to maintain the _real_ and
_proper punishment_ of Christ, he talks of his being “guilty by
imputation.” The term _guilty_, I am aware, is often used by
theological writers for _an obligation to punishment_, and so applies
to that voluntary obligation which Christ came under to sustain the
punishment of our sins: but strictly speaking, guilt is the _desert_
of punishment; and this can never apply but to the offender. It is the
opposite of innocence. A voluntary obligation to endure the punishment
of another is not guilt, any more than a consequent exemption from
obligation in the offender, is innocence. Both guilt and innocence are
transferable in their effects, but in themselves they are
untransferable. To say that Christ was _reckoned_ or _counted_ in the
divine administration _as if he were_ the sinner, and came under an
obligation to endure the curse or punishment due to our sins, is one
thing: but to say he _deserved_ that curse, is another. Guilt,
strictly speaking, is the inseparable attendant of transgression, and
could never therefore for one moment occupy the conscience of Christ.
If Christ by imputation became _deserving_ of punishment, we by
non-imputation cease to deserve it; and if our demerits be literally
transferred to him, his merits must of course be the same to us: and
then, instead of approaching God as _guilty_ and _unworthy_, we might
take consequence to ourselves before him, as not only guiltless, but
meritorious beings.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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