inseparably connected with them, so that the one cannot be without the other. Therefore, it is sufficient to our purpose, to suppose that they are capable of those blessings which faith desires, and, it may be, hopes for; and, consequently, of those things which are principally signified in baptism. (2.) Infants are under an indispensable obligation to perform the duties which are incumbent on those who are given up to God in baptism, and signified thereby. This respects some things future, (they being, at present, incapable of performing any duty) and, indeed, obligations to perform duties may respect the time to come, as well as the time present; as when a person is bound to pay a just debt, this obligation is valid though it is not expected that it should be immediately paid. Thus infants are professedly bound, when given up to God, to be the Lord’s: Whether ever they will give up themselves to him by faith, or no, is unknown to us, nevertheless, the obligation will take place as soon as they are capable of doing good or evil. Therefore it follows, that the parent may bind his child to be the Lord’s, inasmuch as the obligation is just, as being founded in God’s right to obedience, and when he has laid his child under it in this ordinance, he ought afterwards strictly to charge him to stand to it, as he would not contract double guilt; not only in neglecting to perform an indispensable duty, but to pay that debt of obedience which has been so solemnly acknowledged in this ordinance. These arguments taken from the nature and design of the ordinance of baptism, give me the fullest conviction concerning our warrant to apply it to infants: But there is one more which is not wholly to be passed over, _viz._