The 3rd division again advanced steadily. We saw before us our foes completely overthrown. Thousands of them were taken prisoners by the dragoons, numbers were cut down, and the remainder, in total deroute, were running as fast as their legs could carry them towards another height, where a considerable number of their troops were posted, and from whence they kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions engaged upon our left. They soon after, however, began to retire, under a ruinous fire from our artillery and sharpshooters, who, intermixed with some of our dragoons, gave them not a moment's respite. Our loss, however, had been considerable, for the French, before they gave way, generally contrived to open a very heavy irregular fire upon us, which the battalions advancing in line, and with our light infantry in front, could not return, had it even been desirable that they should have done so. The 3rd division, thus aided and supported by our splendid dragoons, were, however, completely victorious. The enemy's left was entirely discomfited, carrying alarm and confusion amongst their centre and right; and just before darkness hid them from our sight, their right alone seemed to me to maintain any thing like order, though the whole still kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions of our army with which they were engaged. We had, however, committed one mistake, in following up the enemy, for we had inclined too much to our left, and had thereby thrown away the advantage we would have had in still acting even after dark, upon the French left and rear. Had the 3rd division been kept more to the right, instead of coming at dusk almost in rear of the troops engaged with the enemy upon our left; and had it, supported by our cavalry, continued to act even in the dark, I cannot imagine how the enemy could have been able to re-cross the Tormes. The celebrated Lord Stair being asked by Voltaire, at the Hague, what he thought of the battle of Dettingen, in which he commanded the British under George the Second, he replied, that the French had committed one great fault, and the allies two. That of the French was, that they did not know how to wait; and the allies, after having placed the French on the brink of ruin, did not profit by the victory they had gained. At Salamanca, French impatience and eagerness to force us to retreat, when we most likely would have done so had they let us alone, hurried them to their ruin; and it being probably unavoidable, that we should have halted on the field of battle for the night, afforded the French, after being completely defeated, time to escape.