Consider then, the acts, and habits, and disposition of the understanding; and you will find, That some acts, and the privation of them, are necessary, naturally, originally, and unalterably; and these are not virtues or sinful at all, as having no morality. As, to know unwillingly, as the devils do, and to believe when it cannot be resisted, though they would; this is no moral virtue at all, but a natural perfection only. So, 1. To be ignorant of that which is no object of knowledge, or which is naturally beyond our knowledge, as of the essence of God, is no sin at all. 2. Nor, to be ignorant of that which was never revealed, when no fault of ours hindered the revelation, is no sin. 3. Nor, to be without the present, actual knowledge or consideration of one point, at that moment when our thoughts are lawfully diverted, as in greater business, or suspended, as in sleep. 4. But to be ignorant, wilfully, is a sin, participatively in the intellect, and originally in the will. 5. And to be ignorant for want of revelation, when ourselves are the hinderers of that revelation, or the meritorious cause that we want it, is our sin: because, though that ignorance be immediately necessary, and hypothetically, yet originally and remotely it is free and voluntary. So, as to the habits and disposition of the intellect; it is no sin to want those, which man's understanding in its entire and primitive nature was without. As, not to be able to know without an object, or to know an unrevealed or too distant object, or actually to know all things knowable, at once. But there are defects or ill dispositions, that are sinfully contracted; and though these are now immediately natural[98] and necessary, yet being originally and remotely voluntary or free, they are participatively sinful. Such is the natural man's disability or undisposedness to know the things of the Spirit, when the word revealeth them. This lieth not in the want of a natural faculty to know them, but, 1. Radically in the will. 2. And thence in contrary, false apprehensions which the intellect is prepossessed with, which resisting the truth, may be called, its blindness or impotency to know them. And 3. In a strangeness of the mind to those spiritual things which it is utterly unacquainted with. Note here, 1. That the will may be guilty of the understanding's ignorance, two ways: either, by positive averseness prohibiting or diverting it from beholding the evidence of truth; or, by a privation and forbearance of that command or excitation which is necessary to the exercise of the acts of the understanding. This last is the commonest way of the sin in the understanding; and that may be truly called voluntary which is from the will's neglect of its office, or suspension of its act, though there be no actual volition or nolition. 2. That the will may do more in causing a disease in the understanding, than it can do in curing it. I can put out a man's eyes, but I cannot restore them.