If you say, the will's first sinful adhesion in the sixth instance, could not be, unless the intellect first directed it so to do; I deny that, because the will is the first principle in men's actions _quoad exercitium_, though the intellect be the first as to specification. And therefore the will could suspend its exercise and its excitation of the mind. In all this I go upon common principles: but I leave it to further inquiry; 1. How far the sensitive appetite may move the locomotive faculty without the will's command, while the will doth not forbid? And whether reason be not given man, as the rider to the horse, not to enable him to move, but to rule his motion: so that as the horse can go if the rider hinder not, so the sensitive appetite can cause the actions of eating, drinking, thinking, speaking sensually, if reason do but drop asleep, or not hinder. 2. And so whether in the first sin (and ordinarily) the sensitive appetite, fantasy, and passion be not the active mover, and the rational powers first guilty only by omitting their restraining government, which they were able to have exercised? 3. And so, whether sin be not (ordinarily) a brutish motion, or a voluntary unmanning of ourselves, the rational powers in the beginning being guilty only of omission or privation of restraint; but afterwards brought over to subserve the sensitive appetite actively? 4. And so, whether the will, which is the _principium actus quoad exercitium_, were not the first in the omission? The intellect having before said, This must be further considered, the will commanded not that further consideration, when it could and should? However, if it be too hard for us to trace our own souls in all their motions, it is certain that the will of man is the first subject of moral good and evil; and uncertainties must not make us deny that which is certain. The reader who understandeth the importance and consequence of these points, I am sure, will pardon me for this interposition of these difficult controverted points (which I purposely avoid where I judge them not very needful in order to the defence or clearing of the plainer common truths): and as for others, I must bear their censure. The degree of sinfulness in the will lieth in a stiffness and obstinacy, a tenaciousness of deceitful temporal good, and an eagerness after it; and stubborn averseness to spiritual good, as it is against that temporal fleshly good. This is the will's disease.[99]